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Abstract. Controlling strategy has been portrayed as a matter of managing tensions. But what 
are these tensions and how do they arise in firms? In this paper, organizational strategy is 
represented by a target operating model that is maintained by dialectical relationships 
between functional areas. Using a pragmatic constructivist framework, the functional areas 
may be conceptualised as specialised managerial topoi. Drawing on field work in the 
hospitality industry, the paper employs an actor-based research methodology to show that 
organizational tensions may develop out of conflicts between the different goals and logics 
associated with the various functional areas such as marketing, sales, revenue management 
and finance. Although there was evidence of accountants acting as custodians of the 
budgetary system, in some situations, other functional areas such as marketing or revenue 
management seemed to be the corporate policemen as they protected the corporate brand 
against unplanned price discounting or short term cost saving tactics. Rather than seeing 
functional specialisation as a disruptive obstacle to organizational coherence, the paper 
presents arguments and evidence which suggest that with the deployment of the principles of 
dialectical management, tensions between the different business functions can enhance 
strategic control and development. 
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1. Introduction 
How do managers exercise strategic control? Many researchers have noted that an important 
part of strategic control involves the identification and management of tensions in the 
organization. Focusing on the role of management control systems, some researchers have 
built on the seminal insights of the levers of control (LOC) model (Simons, 1995; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2004; Tuömela, 2005; Widener, 2007; Mundy, 2010, Tessier & Otley, 2012). The 
LOC model is usually portrayed as a management system in which organizational tensions 
are constructed through an intentional interplay between different types and levels of control. 
In short, organizational tensions are seen as being “designed” by senior managers through 
their use of control systems. Although researchers have been inclined to focus on tensions 
between performance management systems, Simons himself argued that levers of control 
should be broadly defined to included organizational systems such as standard operating 
procedures and codes of practice (Simons, 1994; 1995).  The Simons (1995) LOC framework 
does discuss the possibility of blending organic and mechanistic control but, as Ahrens and 
Chapman point out, concepts such as belief and boundary systems are ‘very general’ (2004, 
p. 278) and the relationship between mechanistic and organic control remains ‘relatively 
unspecified’ (2004, p. 278). 
    The paper uses an actor-reality
1
 perspective (Jakobsen et al., 2011) to conceptualise 
organizational tensions. As well as suggesting a model of creative governance, the actor-
reality approach can help to evaluate the success/failure of particular management control 
frameworks by drawing on the criterion of practical validity (Nørreklit, 2011). Practical 
validity in management control means that organizational action is informed by reality rather 
than by illusions or myths (Nørreklit, 2011; Nørreklit et al., 2012)) and is more likely to be 
achieved through bottom up rather than top down principles (Cinquini et al., 2013).  
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     In order to conceptualise organizational tensions, the paper builds on the behavioural 
theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1992) in which rivalries emerge between different 
functional areas and in which organizational outcomes are achieved through successful 
coalition building. In contrast, the actor-reality perspective used in this paper conceptualises 
the various functional areas as socially constructed sub-units with their own facts, logics, 
values and communication systems (Nørreklit et al., 2006; Nørreklit, 2011). Rather than 
seeing the direction of the firm determined solely through the management of political 
processes, strategy may be controlled through an actor-based leadership style which ‘implies 
enhanced awareness of the situation and competences of people and the function and power 
of communicative action’ (Nørreklit, 2011, p. 9). We term this model of leadership 
dialectical management by design (DMD) whereby senior managers control and adjust 
corporate strategy by recognising and even encouraging conflicts between functional areas of 
the organization. These conflicts may result in more successful organizations as business 
knowledge is created through dialectical thinking and action (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009).    
      A central contribution of the paper is that it argues that the actor-based and the dialectical 
management models are mutually supportive. Whilst the dialectical management approach is 
based on respect for the particular values, logics, facts and communication of organizational 
members who are influenced by their functional specialisms, the key principle from actor-
based management is the co-authorship of the organization’s lead story (Nørreklit, 2011). In 
this paper, co-authorship does not imply power equality between senior and junior staff but 
rather a recognition by the former that the organizational story is co-authored through the 
dialectical resolution of the different modes of thinking associated with different functional 
areas and different organizational roles. As will be demonstrated, the combination of actor-
based and dialectical management principles addresses many of the issues associated with the 
     4 
 
“illusion of management control”, which Dermer and Lucas (1986) attributed to a failure to 
recognise the multirational and political aspects of organizational decision making.   
     A second and related contribution of the paper arose out of the empirical fieldwork which 
showed that organizational tensions may not necessarily follow the conventional expectations 
often found in the finance literature where the accountant’s role of corporate policeman may 
at times conflict with other perceived roles such as business partner (Sathe 1982; 1983; 
Jablonsky et al., 1993; Järvenpää, 2007; Baldvinsdottir et al., 2009). Although we found 
evidence in our fieldwork of accountants acting as traditional custodians of the budgetary 
system, we found that the marketing and/or revenue management functions could also be 
portrayed as the corporate policemen when they sought to protect the corporate brand against 
unplanned price discounting or short-term cost saving tactics. All these conflicts and tensions 
both within and between functional specialisms can productively be conceptualised using 
dialectical principles. Although we do not argue that each and every case study demonstrated 
either an ideal enactment of actor-based management or of well-designed applications of 
dialectical thinking, we did find interesting examples whereby overall organizational 
effectiveness was enhanced rather than damaged by the interaction between the contrasting 
logics and values of the various functional specialisms. Reflecting on our conceptual 
framework and our empirical findings, we have derived some propositions which summarise 
the main features of a DMD framework.  
    The paper is organized as follows. The next section analyses some of the conceptual issues 
relating to the pursuit by managers of multiple, possibly conflicting objectives. The third 
section reports on some original fieldwork from three case studies taken from the hospitality 
industry, which show how managers understand and make productive use of dialectical 
organizational dynamics. The fourth section discusses the fieldwork in the light of the 
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theoretical and methodological frameworks and then puts forward some propositions on 
dialectical management control. The fifth section summarises and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Organizational topoi and their integration though dialectical processes 
Although there are a number of management control frameworks that could be used in the 
pursuit of strategic control (Otley, 1999), many are characterised by a top-down, mechanical 
approach in which control is seen in terms of pulling levers or pushing buttons (Nørreklit, 
2011; Cinquini, et al., 2013). This mechanical view suggests an ‘organization as machine’ 
analogy (Morgan, 1986) in which the only actors of importance are senior managers and 
other organizational members are passive recipients of top-down instructions. In contrast, we 
propose a view of the firm in which, in principle, all organizational members are actors 
representing a variety of organizational interests and groupings. 
 
2.1. Developing the behavioural theory of the firm through an actor-reality perspective 
The conceptualisation of the firm as a functionally differentiated set of groupings has a long 
history in the organizational and management literatures. For example, Lawrence and Lorsch 
defined an organization as ‘a system of interrelated behaviours of people who are performing 
a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems’ (1967, p. 3). Similarly, 
Cyert and March argued that the organization ‘…is a coalition of individuals, some of them 
organized into sub-coalitions’ (1992, p. 32) and that the ‘existence of conflict is a 
conspicuous feature of organizations (1992, pp. 32-33). In Cyert and March’s behavioural 
theory of the firm different departments of the organization such as production, sales and 
marketing have different goals. Whilst our perspective on the firm builds on the behavioural 
theory of the firm, which sees the different functional areas in terms of sub-unit interest 
groups, we propose that the firm is more like an assemblage (DeLanda, 2006; Sheppard, 
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2008)  or a dispersed social agency (Thompson, 1986) which is  the ‘site or point of 
intersection of quite disparate social mechanisms and calculating practices including legal 
conditions, financial strategies and distinct processes of labour’ (Miller, 1991, p. 736).  
     In contrast to the behavioural theory of the firm, we argue that tensions in a socially 
constructed, actor-based viewpoint of organization are based not merely on different goals 
but also on different concepts and perspectives on reality (Nørreklit, 2011; Cinquini et al., 
2013). In the actor-reality approach to management, the actors in the different functional 
areas construct their reality with specific logics, facts and communications. This multi-
dimensional but integrated view of managerial reality is termed pragmatic constructivism
2
 
(PC) whereby organizational reality and success are interdependent and based on the criterion 
of practical validity. If the management control of the firm’s strategy is based on reality 
rather than illusions of control (Dermer and Lucas, 1986) then we can say it has practical 
validity (Nørreklit, 2011; Cinquini et al., 2013).  
      This section proceeds by explaining the actor-reality based approach to management. This 
approach fulfils several functions in the paper. First, it enables us to develop a particular view 
of the firm in which the different functional areas have a multi-dimensional, socially 
constructed perspective derived from PC concepts (Nørreklit, et al., 2006). Secondly, we will 
then explain how the sub-units may be integrated to form a management control topoi for the 
whole firm. Thirdly, the actor-reality approach enables us to interpret the case study evidence 
in order to evaluate whether the dialectical approaches described in the fieldwork constitute 
successful management control topoi.  
    
2.2. Practical validity and a multi-dimensional PC view of reality 
The emphasis on validity in the actor-reality approach prompts the question: what is reality 
and the converse- what are illusions? Nørreklit argues that ‘reality is not a static thing but a 
well-functioning actor-world relationship’ and is the ‘integration of the four dimensions of 
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facts, possibility, value and communication’ (2011, p. 17). The main characteristics of the PC 
approach are as follows: 
1. The PC approach recognises the difference between researching the social world in 
which facts are constructed by complex relationships between ‘actors’ and ‘things’ and 
researching the physical world where knowledge of things is, at least conceptually, more 
straightforward.  Nørreklit argues that in a PC perspective, facts are ‘not things in the world 
but a cognitive relation between an actor and things in the world…and things are ‘facts to us 
when they are well known’ (2011, p. 25).  Some facts may be what Searle (1995) would 
characterize as ‘brute facts’, that is, they exist independent of human consciousness. 
Organizations will differ in terms of their proportion of brute facts and socially-constructed 
facts. For example, whilst an electricity-generating power station is the result of human 
construction and ingenuity, many of the concepts used in construction and guiding managers 
will be based on the principles of physics and chemistry and are subject to physical forces. In 
other organizations, such as banks, the ‘facts’ such as money, asset values and profit are 
socially or institutionally constructed (Searle, 1995; Nørreklit, et al. 2006).  
2. In the PC approach, facts are defined by their possibilities or logics. Although 
possibilities are grounded in facts, ‘all matters of fact are loaded with possibilities ... the 
nature of everything is determined by possibilities and impossibilities that are integrated in 
things … a door that cannot be opened, because in reality it is part of the wall …it is no real 
door’ (Nørreklit, 2011, p. 27). The PC framework sees managers and other organizational 
members as reflexive actors who constantly monitor both existing and alternative practices. 
In short, they are considering different possibilities. As Nørreklit explains, possibilities are 
‘constructs of something that does not presently exist based on something that does 
exist …and to ‘construct possibilities, one must perform logical operations’ (2011, p. 25). 
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3. Since actors need to be motivated, a third dimension of reality in the PC approach is 
values. Unlike in neoclassical economic theory, the PC approach does not assume a particular 
universalist set of individualist or self-seeking values. Since values are a person’s motivating 
force, Nørreklit et al. (2006, p. 47) argue that ‘if the world does not appeal to the values of a 
person, that person becomes passive’ and ‘managers should recognize and respect the values 
of employees in order to strongly motivate them’. If managers and/or employees are self-
seeking and individualistic, it may be because wider cultural values encourage such attitudes. 
4. The final dimension of reality in the PC approach is communication. Without 
communication, there might be a world of things but no social, institutional or even 
individual human reality. As Nørreklit et al. put it:  
Without communication, only individual reality exists: there is no intersubjective 
socially organized reality and neither companies nor institutions to be managed. Such 
disconnected “reality” is, however, not possible because communication is a 
necessary aspect of individual reality (2006, p. 48). 
 
    Communication plays a very special role in strategic control because it is the key to the 
integration between the other dimensions as it ‘formats the organization as a common space 
of meaning’ (Nørreklit, 2011, p. 30). If reality was solely composed of facts, communication 
would just consist of a simple exchange of information. In a multi-dimensional view on 
reality, communication helps to not only to construct the other three dimensions of reality but 
to integrate them via organizational arguments or rhetorics. In PC, these arguments are 
known as topos or, in the plural, topoi. If the dimensions of the topos are integrated 
successfully then the firm’s management control approach will be characterised by practical 
validity in the sense that organizational activity is informed by reality rather than illusion.  
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2.3. Functional differentiation and integration: a dialectical perspective   
Having introduced the main principles of actor-reality, we can now show how it can be used 
in the specific context of functional differentiation and dialectical processes. The actor-reality 
perspective on functional differentiation is explained by Nørreklit as follows: 
Business is composed of overlapping but different fields of knowledge and meaning: 
sales, production, R&D, marketing, finance and so on. Each field has its own theories 
and develops its own special language, topoi and stories. Thus the organization is 
constructed of a group of integrated units. All these units coordinate their activities 
although the logic of their operating topoi not only differ but often are incompatible. 
Thus although they are incompatible, they do nevertheless complement each other in 
creating the business (2011, p. 36). 
 
    Although in the later sections of the paper we develop functional and organizational topoi 
that are drawn from fieldwork undertaken in actual organizations, at this stage, we present 
rather stylised functionally-based topoi that illustrate their generic characteristics. For these 
reasons, we have called the figures 1a and 1b “stylized thinking” and ascribed simplified and 
instrumental values and logics based on functional thinking “on its own”, that is, in isolation 
from other functional areas
3
. With these caveats in mind, we suggest that the topos for a 
finance manager may be represented in figure 1a in the central ellipse where the different 
dimensions of reality are integrated. The values and logics/possibilities may vary according 
to wider economic and institutional influences such as the ownership of the business. For 
example, the focus on short-term profits may be greater if the company is publicly quoted and 
the financial markets expect quarterly earnings reports. In terms of other functional areas 
such as marketing, the values and logics may be influenced by the educational and training of 
practitioners. Thus the reality for the marketing manager may be shown in figure 1b where 
the marketing department may be influenced by a ‘marketing concept’ where profits come 
through customer satisfaction based on integrated marketing techniques (Kotler et al., 2005). 
In contrast, the sales function sees profits as derived from sales volumes which are driven by 
selling and promotional techniques. As an emerging function with particular importance in 
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the hospitality sector (Mattimoe and Seal, 2011), the revenue management department will 
perceive that profits are generated through maintaining the average revenue per available 
room (that is, the well- known metric, Revpar).  
 
[ Figure 1a,  here. Stylized thinking in “finance on its own”] 
 
[Figure 1b. here. Stylized thinking in “marketing on its own”] 
 
2.4.  Conceptualising an organizational topos: the Target Operating Model  
So far we have shown how individual functional areas can be seen as developing their own 
specific topoi. Yet how are these various topoi combined to form a business or organizational 
wide topos? Nørreklit argues that in the various staff or functional areas of the organization 
‘analyses are temporarily detached from contexts of realisation’ but that they ‘may clarify 
new aspects that then can be integrated and improve performance’ (2011, p. 31). Nørreklit 
argues that a ‘problem of complementary functions or disciplines is inherent in business and 
calls for an overarching business topos for governing the company as a meta-topos that 
conceptualises the identity of the business and the strategic issues of integrating its operating 
topoi’ (2011, p. 36). The concept of topos (plural topoi) is an important way of summarising 
the integration of the multiple dimensions of reality in particular organizational settings such 
as a company. Nørreklit argues that actors in businesses need the guidance of ‘lead stories’ 
and ‘scripts’ but emphasises that company topoi ‘differ from general instruments, theories 
and tools in that their concepts are company and business specific (2011, p. 14).   
     In the context of this paper, we may interpret lead stories and scripts as the firm’s strategy 
which, in an actor- based perspective, combines market positioning with the resource-based 
thinking (Cinquini et al., 2013). Yet we would also argue that although organizations may 
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have well established routines and standard operating procedures (Nelson and Winter, 1992), 
the control of strategy implies an ability not just to “keep on track”, but also a capacity to 
react to new strategic threats and opportunities- for strategy to emerge (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Simons, 1995). In order to reflect this emphasis on organizational flux and flexibility, we 
have drawn on a term that is commonly used by management consultants, the target operating 
model (TOM). Ross et al., argue that the term operating model ‘describes how a company 
wants to thrive and grow’… (and)... (by) providing a more stable and actionable view of the 
company than strategy, the operating model drives the design of the foundation for execution’ 
(2006, p. 26). In contrast to most consultants who tend to emphasise conscious design, we 
have conceptualised the firm as an assemblage. Although this conceptualisation suggests less 
conscious design and more spontaneity, it does not, however, imply organizational anarchy. 
In an actor-based view of the firm, the TOM is both business specific (rather than general) 
and based on the principle of co-authorship rather than the product of the mind of a single 
dominant leader.  
   Co-authorship need not imply consensus. Indeed, with dialectical thinking and 
relationships, tensions between different functional areas may actually be a deliberate part of 
a business specific mega-topos which celebrates functional differentiation and creativity, 
rather than tries to suppress it. In this conceptualisation of the organization, management 
nurtures and respects the norms of the different functional areas and deploys them 
dialectically to produce new organizational knowledge that enables them to control the wider 
strategic stance.  
 
2.5. Dialectical management control and the Socratic method 
There have been a few applications of dialectics in the management control literature. For 
example, Van de Van and Poole (1995), Macintosh (1994) and Kilfoyle and Richardson 
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(2011) have viewed organizations as sites of conflict between a thesis and an antithesis that 
produce an outcome, a synthesis. In some uses of dialectics, the focus is on conflict between 
different levels (subordinate versus superior) as in the dialectic of control (Giddens, 1984) or 
in Marxist analysis, between classes. Indeed, dialectical approaches may have been 
handicapped in the management literature because of an association with the dialectical 
materialism of Marx (Benson, 1978; Seo and Creed, 2002).  In contrast to the materialist 
model, Nielsen argues that there are a variety of dialectic change processes which differ ‘with 
respect to (a) types of phenomena  in conflict, (b) emotionality  of conflicts, (c) types of 
conflict resolution processes, and (d) different priority foci as ways of learning or ways of 
acting’ (1996, p. 280). These dialectical processes are not mutually exclusive and can act 
simultaneously and/or sequentially. In this paper, the emphasis is on dialectical thinking as 
first developed by Plato and Socrates and on dialectical relations between actors in 
organizations. In the Socratic dialectic, conflicts take place within a co-operative atmosphere. 
As Nielsen puts it: 
Idea (a) is in conflict with idea (b). People and groups are not in conflict; only the 
ideas are in conflict. The emotionality of the conflict is friendly or at least civil. 
Partners in the conversation are able to discuss conflicts among ideas without 
getting angry with one another…it is less important to advocate an individual 
position than it is to cooperate in the dialogic process (1996, p. 281). 
 
    Dialectical relations are usually seen as being dyadic/triadic. Yet if the firm is 
conceptualised as a dispersed social agency as argued earlier, then dialectical relations may 
be multi-faceted (Bhaskar, 1993; Sheppard, 2006). At an individual level, the actor may use 
dialogue and dialectical methods as a way of reflecting on their actions in that they define 
what they do by reference to how they think or act in opposition to what others in the 
organization are doing (Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009). Indeed, as we shall develop more fully 
below in our discussion of the concept of corporate policeman, some specialists can 
experience internal conflicts about their occupational roles and create new knowledge by 
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achieving a resolution or synthesis. In other situations, specialists may have defined their own 
role within the organization by contrasting it with the organizational roles of specialists in 
other functional areas. Whether the conflicts are within or between individual specialisms, a 
dialectical resolution of conflict produces a creative synthesis ‘which is contingent upon 
some perceptual, conceptual, or empirical reorganization by both the organization and its 
members’ (Lorenco and Glidewell, 1975, p. 491). Carr explains that any synthesis is not a 
middle ground between two starting points but a ‘new “working reality” and may, in turn 
become a thesis (which then engenders its own antithesis)’ (2000, p. 215). In this context, the 
role of the manager is not to design a static TOM but rather ‘recognise, and work through, the 
tensions and strains that inevitably arise from the contradictions, oppositions and negations’ 
(Carr, 2000, p.217).  
 
2.6. Dialectical relations and the corporate policeman concept 
In the accounting literature, the same accounting professional may actually be internally 
conflicted over the various roles that they are expected to play within the organization. In 
particular, for management accountants/controllers, there may be a conflict between a 
corporate policemen role and a business partner/advocate role.  Hartmann and Maas explain 
this tension as follows: 
As corporate policemen, controllers are agents of higher level managers and 
organisational stakeholders. Their main responsibilities are to make sure all decisions 
made at lower levels of the organisation are in the interest of the firm as a whole (by 
stressing operating efficiency and conservation of corporate resources) and to ensure 
compliance with rules and regulations and technical bookkeeping procedures. As 
business advocates on the other hand, BU controllers are primarily focused on 
providing assistance to BU managers. They help develop and implement BU 
strategies and actively participate in running their units’ operations… (2011, p. 441). 
 
   One of the issues that will be explored through the case studies below is to evaluate the 
alternative ways of resolving the role conflicts facing the management accountant. One of the 
alternatives that is often advocated in both academic and professional circles is that the 
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management accountant emphasises new competencies in strategy or marketing that suggests 
a value adding capability (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007). Yet as we shall see below, some 
of the practitioners in our case studies argued that possible conflicts may best be resolved 
through the dialectical management of differing functional specialisms rather than by 
expecting the individual specialist to find some sort of internal resolution on their own. This 
organizational resolution of conflicting functional roles perhaps recognises that dialectics are 
not just a matter of thinking, but also of acting. Supposedly, a policeman acts to deter crime 
and/or arrest perceived law breakers. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
To conclude this section of the paper, we have developed a conceptual framework for a 
management control approach that combines actor-reality and dialectical principles. This 
theoretical framework offers a prescription for addressing the illusion of control problem 
discussed by Dermer and Lucas (1986).  Dermer and Lucas argued that the illusion of 
management control ‘fosters the belief among managers that conventional controls such as 
operating standards, profit targets and budgetary criteria accurately and validly measure, and 
thereby control behaviour’ (1986, p. 471). On its part, the DMD model accepts the premise 
put forward by Dermer and Lucas ‘that political relationships between interest groups within 
an organization play a large part in determining its decision process and the outcomes of that 
process’ (1986, p. 471) but proposes that this premise may be converted from a potential 
problem to an opportunity for creative strategic control. The next section shows how the 
theoretical framework can be applied in specific empirical settings. 
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3. The cases 
Although the perspective on strategic control that has been presented so far is quite general, 
the whole essence of the actor-reality approach is that managers develop a business specific 
management control topos (Nørreklit, 2011). In order to explore these general concepts in 
particular organizational settings, this section presents and interprets selected extracts from 
interviews conducted as part of a wider research project on management accounting in the 
hospitality industry. Rather than present in-depth case studies, the primary aim of the case 
material in this section is to illustrate the theoretical framework with empirical examples of 
the concepts developed in section two. As will be seen, each case study provided different 
examples of the overall DMD framework.  
   Interviews were taped and transcribed and conducted by two researchers. Interviews were 
semi-structured and drew on themes informed by the accounting and hospitality literatures. 
For example, drawing on the prescriptive hospitality literature, the researchers were aware 
that hotels tended to be market- rather than cost-oriented businesses and thus the role of 
pricing and sales would probably reveal areas of innovation (Kotas, 1975; Brignall, 1997; 
Mattimoe and Seal, 2011). The level and variety of interviewees varied between the cases 
but,  since the research project was funded by an accounting body, a common theme was a 
search for possible innovations in management accounting practices across a variety of 
hospitality businesses. In two cases, Nationalpub and Nationalhospitality, the companies 
were very large hospitality chains and the researchers focused on head office practices. In 
Nationalpub, access was limited to a senior finance executive. In Nationalhospitality, 
however, it was possible to interview managers from a variety of functional areas such as 
finance, marketing, information technology, sales and revenue management. Indeed, in 
Nationalhospitality, the key contact manager was keen to present a multi-functional 
perspective on the organization. In the third case, Babylon, a single site hotel, the researchers 
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were able to interview the most senior manager in the organization. Although some of the 
quotations are rather long, this length is justified because, in the spirit of actor-based research 
(Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009), it is important not to impose a researcher-based summary of the 
key issues in the cases. The aim is to capture the natural language and authentic reflections of 
the interviewees (Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009). 
      
3.1.  Nationalpub 
3.1.1 Case background 
Nationalpub was a major operator of managed pubs and pub restaurants in the UK with a 
high quality estate. It had 21 brands and about 1,900 pubs and restaurants. The main focus 
was on the informal, value for money, eating and drinking out market in a pub environment. 
Although the company was quoted in the mid-cap sector of the London stock exchange, two 
individuals owned 30% of the shares. Historically, the company had been ‘drink-led’ but had 
recently chosen to become more ‘food-led’. This change in strategy was being implemented 
via disposals of the more drink-led outlets, but also through a change in emphasis in the 
group support functions such as management accounting.     
    The TOM was based on two main strands. First, the pubs were segmented into different 
brand groupings. Often the grouping depended on the location (city-centre versus 
rural/suburb). The second strand involved increasing sophistication in terms of central 
monitoring of labour scheduling against forecast sales, pricing, and food and drink 
purchasing. These central developments were the responsibility of the head office finance 
function whilst the individual brands were the responsibility of brand managers who were 
supported by regional retail business managers. Local managers were responsible for specific 
pub topoi but they had relatively little freedom of action given the central financial controls 
and the formulaic imposition of the brands in terms of layouts and menus. 
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3.1.2. Dialectical tensions at Nationalpub 
The finance director did not feel any internal contradictions in her role. She argued that the 
management accounting function had developed into a business partnering role, through its 
increased ability to forecast sales and costs for the pubs. The dialectical tensions were with 
other managers- locally in the pubs and centrally with marketing. As an example of tensions 
with local managers, she described how the labour scheduling system had saved millions of 
pounds in labour costs, but there was scope for further tightening. She put it as follows: 
We’re actually developing something new at the moment that takes it to the next step, 
because there are, with any system there’s holes and there’s warts in the system, 
because people can get round it.  Because, a pub manager being a pub manager, even 
though we tell him he can only spend £3,000, he will overspend that number if he can, 
if he can get away with it, unless we’re there saying that, no, you can’t do that, and 
we’re managing the back end as well.  What we need to do is to be able to stop them 
from spending the extra, and actually, if that interfaced with the payroll, then they 
wouldn’t spend it (emphasis added). 
  Although the aim was to reduce the discretionary spend of the pub manager, she was not 
trying to change the values of the pub manager and convert him/her into a cost cutting 
minion.  A similar tension between a desire to control and a recognition of different values 
was also revealed in her relations with the centrally based marketing function as follows: 
There can be a little tension at times with the marketing team, because the marketing 
team being marketing, want to believe that everything has worked, because there’s 
obviously a huge slug of funds we’re spending marketing our businesses, and they 
don’t like being proved that things haven’t worked.  And sometimes when we run the 
evaluation we say, well no, this hasn’t worked, you know, we haven’t got sufficient 
sales to cover our cost, or, we haven’t got sufficient sales benefit from it so we 
shouldn’t do that again. And that’s really what I see the role of my team as being, 
almost the, we’re the standalone function that is very black and white and says, yes, 
something has worked, or no, something hasn’t worked. (emphasis added). 
          The finance director recognised that there were different ways of looking 
at the tensions with marketing but clearly saw a resolution in terms of financial 
logic. She explained her thinking as follows:   
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When you’ve looked at something three ways, you know, clearly you’ll say 
that, no, I’ve looked at it three ways and that’s the answer, it hasn’t 
worked. And sometimes I have to have those conversations, because I sit 
on the sales and marketing executives, and my role is to present back on 
the findings of how we’re doing on certain initiatives. And so my team’ll 
write papers for me, and I’ll present  those papers back to say, well, okay, 
we’ve run this menu, we’ve got no sales benefit from it, but we’re getting a 
favourable mix and that’s given us some price gain, or it’s given us some 
cost of goods gain. Or I might say, well, we’ve done this, it was an 
advertising campaign, it didn’t work for us, so therefore my 
recommendation is that we don’t do this again.  
 
    Although she had face to face meetings with marketing and sales personnel, her values and 
logics were clearly informed by a standard costing mentality which meant that she expressed 
dialectical tensions in terms of trade-offs in an almost textbook application of variance 
analysis.  
 
3.1.3 Conclusions-Nationalpub 
Nationalpub continued to be successful in a very tough period for the leisure industry, in 
general, and for pubs, in particular. It is evident from our fieldwork that a key source of 
strength in Nationalpub lay in its information technology and depth of analysis. It would be 
difficult for tenanted or owner-managed pubs to match either this sophisticated analysis or 
the centralised buying power available to a national chain. The case also illustrated how 
information technology has changed the role of management accountants away from routine 
report production and towards a more commercial, business analyst role. This role led to 
tensions between the management accounting function and other functional areas such as 
marketing and operations. Although the interviewee did not see the management accountants 
as a corporate police force, she did have the power to curtail what she saw as ineffective 
marketing expenditures. 
     In terms of controlling strategy, Nationalpub exerted strong central control over the 
company’s TOM. In terms of actor-based management principles, the approach was very top-
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down in an industry which was traditionally driven by notions that pubs had an individual 
character which was at least in part authored by the personality of the landlord. Although 
Nationalpub was financially effective, its approach to brand management was based on 
aligning its specific brands with their locality rather than on encouraging local character or 
dining excellence. However, before we fully evaluate this case, we will present two other 
cases.       
 
3.2. Nationalhospitality  
3.2.1 Case background 
Nationalhospitality was a leading hospitality company quoted on the London stock exchange, 
managing market-leading businesses in the budget hotel and restaurant sectors. It had more 
than 30,000 bedrooms across more than 480 locations around the United Kingdom. The 
group also had chains of restaurants which were generally located next to the hotels. 
Increasingly, the two operations had the same general manager. 
     The hotel had a very strong brand backed up by successful advertising aimed at the top 
end of the budget market. The hotels had a single brand whilst the restaurants had several 
brands. Every hotel had a restaurant on the same site. Although the hotels and restaurants 
were analysed and managed centrally as distinct brands, the sites were managed by a single 
general manager and had a single profit and loss account. The brand defined the TOM which 
itself drove the management of revenues and costs. 
    In terms of revenue management, the company had not been keen on dynamic pricing for 
room rates arguing that their national “price promise” was part of the brand. At the time of 
the field work, Nationalhospitality managed capacity largely through stay restrictions and 
using informal cluster management in particular cities. They also used an event pricing policy 
to raise prices if local events pushed up demand. The policy at each hotel was to design 
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standardised rooms to fit the TOM, rather than vary price according to differing room 
characteristics. In this respect, the TOM was literally “built into” the hotels. The standardised 
rooms also facilitated a cost control philosophy informed by standard times for activities such 
as room cleaning. The market power of the group was based on its brand positioning, its 
geographical coverage, on leveraging the customer databases and on effective control of 
distribution channels.  
3.2.2    Dialectical tensions at Nationalhospitality 
The geographical expansion of Nationalhospitality was based on the analyses of a special 
strategy  unit at head office led by a commercial director. This unit undertook much of the 
data gathering and analysis that could be called strategic management accounting/strategic 
investment appraisal (Lord, 2007; Northcott and Alkaraan, 2007). Using industry and local 
geographical data, the unit selected potential sites by modelling the expected revenues for the 
investment models. The operational data for control purposes was more the responsibility of 
the head office finance function as  described below by the commercial director: 
I don’t tend to deal with cost. I’m very much at sales level. Because ours is all about 
comparing how we perform against the competitors. The information you can get 
from competitors tends to be more at sales level.  The way I see it in terms of us and 
finance, although I am kind of part of finance, …. in terms of your traditional finance 
& accounting teams, they’ll very much support the operators in terms of how they 
performed, in terms of certain budgets, in terms of forecasts and things like that. So 
they very much structure their data along the operator path types of things.   
 
 
      The commercial director described his strategy unit as combining abstract analytical skills 
with what he called commercial “nous” because of the contrasts between his two analysts: 
We’ve got two analysts- one on the hotel side, Jim, whose background’s hotels, not 
finance at all, and one on the restaurant side, who actually is a qualified accountant, 
but doesn’t need to be.  It’s because you want analytical skills…You want a 
commercial, effectively an analyst with some commercial nous.  I mean, the 
restaurant guy hasn’t got any experience of our industry, but they’ve kind of got that 
in Jim. You can’t really put your finger on it, but the first to kind of really get to grips 
with what’s going on, and kind of use numbers and the knowledge of the industry and 
market intelligence, and put the two together (emphasis added). 
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     Although it would be an overstatement to interpret the relationship within the strategy unit 
as an example of organizational tensions based on different functional topoi, the creation of 
business knowledge did draw on dialogical relationships between the actors in the strategy 
unit in that the aim was to create a dialogue based on different perspectives and then develop 
a synthesis which is not a compromise, but a new perspective, that will ‘go beyond 
(synthesis) the original opinions…’(Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009, p. 136, original emphasis). 
 
3.2.2.1 Brand maintenance as the “conscience of the business” 
Since there was an ongoing conflict between short-term profit conversion by local operating 
managers and more long-term issues of brand maintenance, Nationalhospitality aimed to 
protect its brand and hence its TOM, through the appointment of specialist brand audit 
managers. One of these managers explained his position by comparing his role as 
championing the guests in contrast with his finance colleagues, whom he saw as championing 
the shareholders. As he put it: 
I manage all our guest research and all our guest insight… …So I very much play a 
“conscience” role within the business in terms of, in the way the finance guys will 
very much represent the shareholder and “are we making the right financial 
decisions”, I very much represent the guests.  
  
3.2.2.2 The revenue manager as corporate policeman 
A third example of inter-functional tension concerned the emerging role of revenue 
management. Although other interviewees, such as those in brand auditing, talked about 
being the “conscience of the company”,  the revenue manager actually talked about himself 
as fulfilling a “policeman role” in that he prevented local managers from unconsidered 
discounting. Before the development of revenue management practices with a focus on 
market segmentation and dynamic pricing (Mattimoe and Seal, 2011), the hotel industry had 
practiced ad hoc price discounting. As the revenue manager put it: 
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Before the recession, I was controlling increases.  And now I think my role, a lot of it, 
is as a sort of policeman. Now I’m stopping them discounting to say, “actually you’re 
going to hurt the long-term profitability of the company and your site” (emphasis 
added).  
 
   Whilst all our interviewees showed some aspects of dialectical thinking, the brand audit and 
revenue managers’ observations on their roles clearly demonstrated the way that practitioners 
often understand what they do in opposition to what others do. In short, they thought and 
talked using dialectical logics in the sense of setting up thesis and antitheses to reflect on 
their own positions but left the synthesis, the going beyond stage (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009, p. 
136) as somewhat unresolved. Yet, as we argue below, the resolution of different viewpoints 
seemed to be based on an organizational atmosphere of co-operation rather than 
confrontation.  
 
3.2.3 Conclusions-Nationalhospitality 
Nationalhospitality had a very robust operating model which was supported by good business 
intelligence. The model was relatively simple to operate, but could also respond to changing 
circumstances. For example, because of pressures from discounting mid-market chains, 
Nationalhospitality had (at least temporarily) began to abandon its price promise and was 
moving towards a more dynamic pricing model. Furthermore, although each restaurant brand 
was relatively fixed, the relative proportions of each brand in the group could be rapidly 
changed in response to changing market conditions. The research focus was on a “head office 
view” of the company. Such a view seemed justified given the highly centralised 
management model. Thus although there could undoubtedly have been deviations at local 
level, the research focus was on how the company had set up systems to monitor and control 
threats to brands or local problems in profit conversion.  
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    In terms of actor-based principles of management, it was evident that the TOM was top 
down in the sense of developing centralised systems and marketing concepts. Yet it was also 
evident that managers had thought about the top-down/bottom up issue. For example, without 
any prompting, the senior revenue manager both identified the problem and proposed a 
resolution based on the principle of comparative advantage. He wanted to leave local 
managers to focus on customer-facing activity rather than analysis of bookings/pricing, and 
so on. As he put it, when describing an imaginary conversation with a local hotel manager: 
We would rather have you (the general manager) in reception, in the restaurant, 
talking to guests, sorting out issues, and doing what you need to do best. Leave some 
of that information analysis to Ms P. (a systems expert), and you worry about the 
operation…  And that’s sort of our mantra in head office.  
     
    In contrast to Nationalpub, Nationalhospitality had a widely recognised and generally well 
liked national brand based on value for money propositions. Also in contrast to Nationalpub, 
dialectical tensions between the functional areas were not resolved solely through financial 
logic. Many of these contrasts could be attributed to different expectations of customers in 
the hotel sector in which the budget hotel concept is well established, whereas the concept of 
the standardised budget pub is less familiar. In the spirit of Socratic dialectics, the tensions in 
Nationalhospitality did not reflect political rivalries, but rather a cooperative atmosphere. To 
give an example of the lack of rivalry or suspicion between functional specialisms, the 
commercial director described how his unit had earlier reported to the marketing director but 
because the marketing director had become overloaded with other reports, the unit now 
reported to the finance director. The dialectical management processes that were identified 
above are illustrated in figure 2. The TOM at Nationalhospitality is shown as emerging 
through dialectical relationships between the functional areas. 
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Figure 2. A schematic illustration of the TOM and dialectical processes at 
Nationalhospitality .  
 
 
3.3 Babylon hotel 
 
 
3.3.1 Case background 
 
General Manager (putting down his mobile): 
That was the VIP that I am just waiting for. It’s a TV celebrity that I need to be there 
for... just give me three minutes....well I am going to be no longer than about six, 
seven minutes. Because I will just be shaking Nicole Kidman’s hand...  
 
    This quotation encapsulates the market position of Babylon hotel as well as the hectic and 
many-faceted roles of a general manager (GM) in a unique luxury hotel. The key success 
factors in Babylon revolved around protecting the brand and responding to the demands of 
individual (often rich or celebrity) guests as well as their second market which focused on 
celebratory occasions. In Babylon, customer relationship management was not a matter of 
anonymous computer software, but tailored towards highly demanding individual guests and 
the common hotel industry mantra of “guest experience” was clearly enacted in the hotel. 
Elaborating on the market position of Babylon with respect to their renowned silver service 
afternoon tea experience, the GM said: 
We are the benchmark so whenever there is an issue, if somebody has an issue, for 
example, with British tea, who are they going to call and ask for a comment?... it will 
be Babylon. So we are the first port of call as to a reaction for the industry if you like 
and that’s the way it needs to remain and the reason that it is that way is because we 
won’t compromise on our standards.  
 
 3.3.2 Dialectical tensions at Babylon 
 The GM explained his relationship with his departmental executives as follows: 
All of the executives form a supportive agency within, amongst each other... What I 
have to do is conduct them all to work together like in an orchestra. They are each 
playing different musical instruments, so I am there to conduct them to make sure that 
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they actually produce a tune. I also challenge each executive as to whether or not they 
should be looking at different levels of contribution on costs savings or perhaps 
looking at value-added concepts... 
    They come to me and say: “This is what I plan to do, do I have the support, the 
finance and the go ahead, given timeframes”? I will either say yes or no and we will 
perhaps discuss it at that point. But I see my role as an overall leader of the eight 
executives. 
 
       In this quotation, the GM developed the analogy of the conductor in an orchestra, co-
ordinating and challenging the individual departmental heads to respond to particular 
initiatives on cost saving or value added. Yet the dialectical aspects of his management 
philosophy emerged when he discussed the relationship between the various functional areas. 
For example, although the GM commented that his financial director was unusually 
interested in operations and thus ‘can then perhaps appreciate and empathise why this cost 
may have leaped 20% because, I don’t know, of a market drought in truffle’, he was keen to 
emphasise the value of contrasting roles and activities. Thus, explaining how he saw the 
different roles of sales and revenue management, the GM said: 
Sales brings in and drives business to the hotel...through word of mouth, through 
meetings, through marketing, through direct mailshots.  The revenue manager, once 
receiving demand, has to be able to balance volume and room rates to fill the hotel. 
And whilst filling the hotel knowing whether or not that room number, that particular 
room or room category will use a food and beverage outlet (emphasis added). 
    In this example, the GM was emphasising the value of functional specialisation. Yet, as we 
shall see below, when he then went on to discuss the role of the finance function, he 
developed a more explicitly dialectical perspective. 
 
3.3.2.1 The finance function as corporate policeman rather than business partner 
The GM was keen to maintain a distance between the finance and revenue management 
functions.  Indeed, he had very strong and precise views on the role of the finance function in 
Babylon as he explained at length: 
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I don’t believe the director of finance would see his role as driving the business. I 
think the director of finance has to be, not aloof, but be able to put himself away from 
certain emotional decisions that are made within a hotel and has to realise that there 
are no friends when there is money owing. We need to go to the director of finance to 
say “We have an issue with x, y and z, how are we going to claw back x amount of 
money?” And he needs to be able to systematically be devoid of any emotion. 
    I don’t think revenue management should ever report into finance because I think 
there is a conflict of interest. I don’t expect our director of finance to be able to 
comprehend why a revenue manager in one of my competitive hotels would drop 
roomrates by 15% at a particular time,.. is it up to the director of finance to know that 
we have a particular convention in town?  No, I don’t think so. 
I am concerned about diluting the role of director of finance too much. Where do you 
draw the line?  And I think his skillset being so selective and so precise, I don’t want 
that diluted in any shape or form. 
 
   The GM was portraying the role of finance as corporate policeman rather than business 
partner. Interviews with staff in the finance function confirmed the image portrayed by the 
GM. Although on the same site as the hotel, the finance function was very much a back office 
operation which employed the standardised accounting system common in the hotel industry 
that was, in its own way, as reflective of “good practice” as the hotel’s afternoon teas.    
 
3.3.3 Conclusions-Babylon 
If hotels can be located on a spectrum from high end luxury at one polar extreme to low end 
budget at the other, then Babylon emphatically represented the former. The location and 
market position dominated every aspect of the management culture. In comparison with other 
objectives such as cost control, guest experience was paramount. Although finance played a 
traditional stewardship role in the hotel, this did not imply that the finance function was either 
inappropriate or somehow “old-fashioned” but rather that its role was consistent with the 
wider management philosophy at Babylon.   
     The management control model at Babylon may be illustrated through the PC framework 
as shown in figure 3. The functional areas are shown as self-referential sytems that are 
integrated by the GM as the self-styled “conductor”. One of the key differences between 
figure 2 and figure 3 is that, the case material revealed a more explicit or designed use of 
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dialectical principles. The integration of the management control topoi at Babylon was 
achieved through monthly meetings of the executive committee which reviewed the 
performance of each department.  Overall, the management style was very face-to-face with 
the GM taking responsibility in encouraging distinctive positions between the functional 
areas and resolving or synthesising the resulting tensions.   
 
[Figure 3, Here. A schematic illustration of the TOM and dialectical processes at 
Babylon] 
 
4. Discussion 
The three cases were quite different in terms of their TOMs. In Nationalpub, there was 
tension between the marketing and finance functions. However, in this case, the “corporate 
policeman” seemed to be the finance function. In Nationalhospitality, a chain of budget 
hotels, the marketing function was either directly or indirectly tasked with maintaining their 
particular operating models/brands. The revenue manager saw his role as preventing price 
discounting and explicitly and without prompting described himself as a corporate policeman 
In the case of Babylon, a single super luxury full service hotel, the GM encouraged functional 
specialisation and personally managed the resulting tensions. Whilst Nationalpub and 
Nationalhospitality illustrated tensions between functional areas,  Babylon showed how the 
tensions could be creatively managed and provided the most complete depiction of the DMD 
model of strategic control.   
      All three cases had functioning topoi which, as Nørreklit (2011) argues, is a necessary but 
not sufficient basis for business success. In an actor-based approach, business success is 
predicated on practical validity in that the organizational topoi are based on reality rather than 
illusions. Given that reality in actor-based management is dependent on the integration of the 
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multiple dimensions of reality (facts, possibilities, value and communication), can we say that 
the TOMs were realistic? Or, more correctly, were the organizational processes consistent 
with the principles of actor-based management?        
        Paradoxically, the most top-down management style (Nationalpub) seemed to 
acknowledge that a centrally planned control system was always going to be characterised by 
an element of illusion (Dermer and Lucas, 1986). In the interviewee’s mind, the marketer was 
subject to a certain level of illusion concerning the likely success of their marketing 
campaigns. Yet she also acknowledged that pub managers (“being pub managers”) were 
inclined to get round centrally set cost standards. In short, she was realistic because 
(unconsciously) had a dialectical mind which enabled her to recognise that plans and control 
systems always have an element of fiction and illusion.  In the case of Nationalhospitality, it 
was relatively easy to assess the success of the company not just in financial terms, but also 
in terms of the creation and maintenance of successful national brands.  Finally, Babylon was 
top-down but also very face-to-face - not just in terms of its management style -  but also in 
terms of its highly personal approach to guest relations. In this case, the GM had explicitly 
designed dialectical organizational relationships, which entailed central co-ordination 
combined with trusting the different specialists to deliver in their own particular areas of 
expertise.      
      Given the organizational context in this paper, the focus is on the dialogues and 
relationships between different functional areas of companies in the hospitality industry. The 
case companies were conventional privately-owned, profit-seeking organizations with 
hierarchies and characteristic inequalities of power and remuneration. Yet although the 
ultimate design and control of strategy resided with senior management, the firms all 
exhibited examples of dialectical management. Sometimes the dialectical relations flowed 
spontaneously out of tensions between functional areas (Nationalpub and 
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Nationalhospitality). In other situations (Babylon), the dialectical processes were more 
consciously designed by senior management, even though they did not refer explicitly to 
dialectical ideas.  
    As argued earlier, the outcome of dialectical processes and thinking seemed to be more 
creative in Nationalhospitality than in Nationalpub, largely because the former seemed to 
have a more balanced relationship between the various functional areas. In Nationalpub, the 
finance function used the business partner rhetoric, but practised a quite traditional corporate 
policeman role (Hartmann and Maas, 2011). In Nationalhospitality, there seemed to be a 
better balance between the various functional areas with examples of how conflicts could be 
used to help the TOM to evolve. In particular, Nationalhospitality saw a need to change its 
pricing policy in the face of competitive threats from the mid-market hotel groups as the 
recession deepened. As the most developed example of dialectical management, the GM at 
Babylon was keen to encourage different functional specialisms to concentrate on what they 
were best at, rather than try to become hybrids (Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2007). 
    In terms of actor-based principles, all three cases had many top-down characteristics. In 
both of the chains, central authority was exercised through the information systems and 
centralised forecasting and purchasing.  In  Babylon, central control was exercised on a more 
face-to-face basis in meetings between the GM and departmental managers. Yet in some 
respects, even the finance director at Nationalpub recognised the importance of respecting 
other organizational actors, whether they were pub managers or marketing executives 
(Nørreklit, 2011). Therefore, it could be argued that in spite of the power issues in all three 
cases, strategic control was the outcome of co-authorship in the sense that senior managers 
respected the mental ownership of the activities of even the least powerful managers. For 
example, the finance director in Nationalpub recognised the character of the typical pub 
manager whose behaviour may need to be monitored, but whose specific guest-facing role 
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was vital to the success of the pub. Similarly, the centralisation of pricing decisions at 
Nationalhospitality was seen as a way of freeing up the local managers to concentrate on the 
guests. Finally, the GM at Babylon saw himself as a conductor of an orchestra- the 
implication of this analogy is that a conductor co-ordinates the different musicians but does 
not tell the violinist how to play her violin. In short, actor-based management was not 
informed through a weakening of top-down power relations, but rather reflected in the 
evident respect for the specialised logics, values, facts and communication systems of the 
various actors within their differentiated functional areas. 
      
4.1. The implications of DMD for management control systems  
The DMD model proposed in this paper and visualised in figures 2 and 3 places the 
management of tension or even intra-organizational conflict as a central rather than a 
periphery feature. The actual functional areas that are in conflict may vary from organization 
to organization. Similarly, the way that the conflicts are managed may also vary between 
organizations. The actor-based perspective emphasises the importance of understanding and 
mobilising the values, logics and facts that inform the actors in different functional areas 
(Nørreklit, 2011). The actor-based approach deems that just setting up organizational systems 
does not in itself ensure the emergence of dialectical processes and productive tensions.  
     As the LOC framework (Simons, 1995) is the closest model to DMD, it seems appropriate 
to make some comparisons. The LOC model seems to portray the organization’s management 
control systems (MCS) as the central foundation of organizational reality and casts senior 
managers as the sole actors in the design of the MCS. In contrast, as expressed in the 
propositions below, the philosophy of DMD implies that the MCS is built around dialectical 
relationships between functionally differentiated sub-units. In short, in the DMD approach, 
the MCS reflects the different functional realities and does not attempt to create them. The 
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DMD approach recognises the central role of senior managers as business leaders but, 
following the principles actor-based management, stresses that the MCS should be designed 
and maintained following the principles of co-authorship and dialectical thinking (Nørreklit, 
2011, Cinquini et al., 2013; Arbnor and Bjerke, 2009). These ideas are summarised below in 
the form of propositions which identify some key aspects of the DMD and the potential 
contribution of dialectical thinking and processes. 
 
4.2. Some Propositions on the DMD framework 
1. Dialectics should be a conscious and welcomed part of the management philosophy of 
an organization. This proposition is predicated on the Socratic version of dialectical 
relationships which assumes that differences in actors’ logics, values, and facts may be 
resolved in an atmosphere of co-operation and through the recognition of an overall 
commonality of interests (Nielsen, 1996).  
2. Functional specialisation should be seen as strength not as weakness. This 
proposition challenges those who have argued for “all-singing, all-dancing” functional areas. 
In the accounting literature, this approach is characterised by calls for strategic management 
accounting based on hybridisation with the incorporation of marketing concepts (Wilson, 
1995). If there are genuine conflicts of roles as with the policemen vs. business partner issue 
discussed earlier, then dialectical thinking can also help as described in the next proposition.    
3. The internal tension between the business partnering and corporate policemen roles 
of the accountant in business may be creatively resolved through dialectical thinking. 
Dialectical thinking does not necessarily mean that the accountant becomes a fixed hybrid 
based on some sort of professional compromise. Rather it means that it with a dialectical 
consciousness, it becomes possible not only for actors to function with internal professional 
contradictions but to use them creatively to raise both personal and organizational 
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effectiveness. To borrow a concept from psycho-analysis, the important point is to recognise 
rather than deny conflicts. This point is related to the next proposition.   
4. Dialectics should be seen as a mode of enquiry/organizational learning. The 
emphasis in the paper has been on maintaining a target operating model. Yet the functional 
dialectics also allowed for emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1978). For example, in case 2, 
Nationalhospitality, the marketing concept of a single national price was challenged by 
evidence from the sale and revenue management  areas, which were reporting market erosion 
due to price discounting by competitors 
    
5. Conclusions 
This paper has presented an actor-based theoretical and methodological framework that has 
been used to develop an approach to strategic management control based explicitly on 
dialectical principles. Adopting a PC methodology, it showed that the tensions that exist 
between different functional areas of an organization may be mobilised to maintain and 
develop specific business models. The framework sees the firm as differentiated assemblage 
composed of a variety of functional areas with their own specific values, facts, logics and 
communications. The firm is guided by a business specific organizational topos, which is 
constructed through co-authorship between business leaders, via multi-dialectical 
relationships between the various functional areas of the firm.   
      The theoretical and methodological concepts were illustrated with fieldwork from the 
hospitality industry. The fieldwork revealed tensions within the various organizations. 
However, the fieldwork also showed how these tensions could be used creatively to maintain 
and develop the operating models of the case study firms. Sometimes the tensions seemed to 
just emerge from the different organizational and/or functional perspectives (e.g. accounting 
versus marketing; head office versus business unit). On other occasions, there were examples 
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of circumstances where overall organizational effectiveness was seen to be enhanced by 
opposing priorities. These situations may be seen as examples of DMD. Although there was 
evidence of accountants acting as custodians of the budgetary system, in other situations, the 
marketing or revenue management functions seemed to be the corporate policemen as they 
sought to protect the corporate brand against unplanned price discounting or short term cost 
saving tactics.  
       The theoretical concepts introduced in this paper could be examined further through in 
depth case study research on single organizations. More generally, we urge practitioners, 
academics and other interested parties, such as consultants, to develop and embrace a 
discourse on the benefits of organizational tensions and conflicts. If dialectical management 
is a “practice that dares not speak its name”, then this paper urges the management 
community to have a fresh look at the dialectical mode of thinking as well as recognising that 
the management of conflicts between functional specialities is as much a management 
package as any of some of the better known approaches such as the balanced score card. By 
treating organizational members as actors, the dialectical mode of strategic control seeks to 
mobilise the specific and varied outlooks of the functional areas in a way that enables the 
firm to develop creative solutions in response to changing business circumstances.      
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1
 The terms actor-based management and actor-reality are used inter-changeably as they are 
in the key sources (Jakobsen, et al., 2011; Cinquini, et al., 2013).   
2
 In their 2006 paper, Norreklit et al sometimes use the term pragmatic constructivism and 
sometimes constructive pragmatism in referring to the same concept. In private 
communication, they have confirmed that their preferred term is pragmatic constructivism 
3
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these suggested titles. 
